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1. Summary  
There is a limited amount of literature on the lessons regarding the effectiveness of UN risk 
management units (RMUs) in Somalia and Afghanistan. Responses from stakeholders 
interviewed is broadly positive. Discussion on risk management includes a range of methods 
used by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This also includes a common recommendation 
for more co-ordination and harmonisation among donors. 
The risk of fraud, diversion and misappropriation of funds has led NGOs and UN agencies to 
focus on risk management practices, including remote programming, withdrawal, third party 
monitoring (TPM) and a broad range of enterprise risk management (ERM) processes. This in 
turn has led to calls for mechanisms to collectively manage risk in certain contexts. 
The UN risk management unit in Somalia (2011) has been replicated in Afghanistan (2014) and 
cited as a potentially useful example. The literature cites several potential advantages of RMUs: 
 the dissemination of information on contractors and government actors who have 
committed fraud between NGOs to reduce ‘information gaps’; 
 maintaining databases of information relevant to fiduciary risks;  
 carrying out monitoring functions which field staff or national agencies may not have the 
capacity to do; 
 allowing NGOs to take a common approach when dealing with governments or non-state 
actors; 
 providing training or capacity building on risk management; 
 sharing best practice for a given context; 
 supporting investigations. 
Disadvantages of the RMUs are: 
 Delays created by extra risk assessments; 
 The limited capacity of RMUs in the face of increasing demand; 
 Confidentiality and privacy issues regarding registers of contractors and ‘blacklists’; 
 Different strategies and willingness to accept risk among parties to an RMU. 
The literature review is largely focused on grey literature and policy papers. While there is some 
documentation on the aims and functions of Risk Management Units, there are only partial 
evaluations of their effectiveness based on interviews. The literature on risk management 
provides examples from a variety of contexts from which indirect lessons can be drawn. A 
number of papers cite interviews pointing to the value of RMUs or similar mechanisms, or reflect 
on the problems brought by the absence of any collective mechanism. This review has therefore 
only been able to make partial conclusions as to the effectiveness of RMUs in fragile settings. 
The literature review is gender-blind and disability-blind. 
2. Background and objectives of RMUs 
Fraud is defined by the Risk Management Unit (RMU) as ‘any action or omission, including non-
declaration of conflicting interest, purposeful deceit; including forgery, or any activities or 
behaviours designed to conceal or obfuscate the occurrence of such activities, that mislead, or 
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attempt to mislead, the United Nations (entity / fund / programme / project) to obtain a financial 
benefit, gain or advantage, or to avoid an obligation’ (RMU Afghanistan, n.d., p. 2). Fraud can be 
conceptualised as a triangle consisting of 1) a perceived opportunity, (2) an incentive or 
pressure, and (3) some way to rationalise or justify the activity itself’ (RMU Afghanistan, n.d., p. 
3). Risk management units are concerned with reducing opportunities for fraud and, by allowing 
discussion and developing procedures, reducing ways to rationalise fraud. 
Various risk management practices have been developed to allow aid agencies to 
continue to operate in difficult contexts (Jacquand & Ranii, 2014, p. 12). Risk management is 
viewed by most organisations as preferable to either not talking about, and accepting, corruption 
in order to maintain access to countries and to protect their reputations, or simply withdrawing 
(Haver & Carter, 2016, p. 51).  
Aid organisations practise a range of risk management activities, falling under the category of 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), including policy manuals and codes of conduct on finance 
and procurement; segregation of duties, rotation of staff, complaint mechanisms, deploying staff 
away from their local communications, and committees to hire staff and buy goods and services; 
and risk registers. Organisations also promote whistle-blower mechanisms, audits and zero-
tolerance policies on fraud (Maxwell et al., 2011, p. 153; NGO Risk Management Principles and 
Promising Practice, n.d.; Stoddard, Haver, & Czwarno, 2016).  
There is a widespread desire for at least some co-ordination in risk management. Although 
most international non-governmental organisations have some internal risk management 
procedures, there is seen to be fragmentation between agencies. A report on risk management 
practices suggests that different standards in risk identification and management between 
different NGOs working in the same region can create difficulties. If these organisations are 
members of an NGO federation or consortium, these different standards can delay important 
decisions (Stoddard et al., 2016, p. 16). In Afghanistan, international agencies expressed 
dissatisfaction with other agencies' monitoring and evaluation systems. They also complained 
about other agencies’ 'lack of willingness to share data or lessons' on corruption issues (Harmer, 
Haver, & Wardak, 2017, p. 23). It is also noted that in Afghanistan, UN agencies has better fraud 
detection systems in Kabul than those in the provinces. This was attributed to cost (Harmer et al., 
2017, p. 30). The report therefore suggests the value of discussing corruption risks at a national 
level, rather than with local officials, so that broad agreement can be reached (Harmer et al., 
2017, p. 29). Co-ordination of information via electronic databases would also help agencies 
better monitor their programmes, especially when using third party monitoring (SAVE, 2015). 
A Transparency International (TI) report on risk management with respect to corruption suggests 
that more inter-agency co-ordination is required (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, pp. 15–16). Most 
risk management policies and practices have focused on individual agency measures, thus far 
meaning that the sharing of best practice could be useful (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 27). 
Many organisations practise informal information co-ordination to share names of individuals or 
contractors who have acted corruptly, or to discuss common approaches, in the absence of 
formal mechanisms (Maxwell et al., 2011, p. 156). This all implies that there is perceived to be 
value in having a body which can co-ordinate risk management, by helping to set common 
policies, guidelines and actions. 
Harmonisation measures can also be used to ensure a consistent and principled 
approach. For example, the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) is used by UN 
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agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.1  The 
use of funds pooled between agencies is another example (Jacquand & Ranii, 2014, p. 14).   
Shared risk management is a potentially useful mechanism. It is widely accepted that 
‘sharing of risk management and other information across organisations constitutes an important 
resource’ in fragile and conflicted-affected states (FCAS) (Donini & Maxwell, 2013, p. 405). Co-
ordination or shared management has a number of potential benefits including: 
 An OECD study argues that ‘specialised units like [RMUs] can provide leadership and a 
responsibility focal point for more risky activities. They can also keep the public and 
political decision makers informed about progress and set-backs on a very regular basis, 
so as to create buy-in' (OECD, 2012, p. 67). 
 Co-ordination can help reduced ‘information gaps’ between agencies or regional and 
national offices (OECD, 2012, p. 93).  
 National NGOs often lack the capacity to establish corruption risk management systems, 
and would therefore benefit from training and support from consortiums (Harmer & 
Grunewald, 2017, p. 27). For example, in Guinea, the national Red Cross society 
developed better financial risk management by asking for help from the larger IFRC 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), which provided 
hardware, software and training (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 36).  
 Collective mechanisms, or simply headquarters support, can allow field staff to discuss 
corruption risks honestly, rather than simply taking the responsibility themselves, and 
perhaps therefore downplaying the risk for the sake of access or reputation (Harmer & 
Grunewald, 2017, p. 40). 
However, it is also suggested that anti-corruption policies need to take into account 
contextual differences and information from local populations. Therefore, while collective 
risk management systems or headquarters might have some role in co-ordinating, training or 
supporting individual NGOs, they should not simply disseminate a standard policy to every 
context or region (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 27).  
Moreover, shared approaches are unlikely to work where the partners have differing 
strategies or approaches to risk (Jacquand & Ranii, 2014, p. 5). Most NGOs working in fragile 
contexts accept some degree of risk, and some may allow for significant financial losses in order 
to continue working. However, the degree of this acceptance may differ considerably between 
NGOs, based on differing priorities and strategies, which would likely strain the working of an 
RMU. 
                                                   
1 ‘The HACT shifts the management of cash transfers from a system of rigid controls to a risk management 
approach by simplifying and harmonizing rules and procedures for transferring resources to implementing 
partners while strengthening their capacity to effectively manage resources. The approach uses macro and micro 
assessments, conducted with implementing partners during program preparation, to determine levels of risk and 
capacity gaps to be addressed. It uses assurance activities such as audits and spot checks during 
implementation and it introduces a new harmonized format for implementing partners to request funds and report 
on how they have been used’ (Jacquand and Ranii, 2014, p. 12). 
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3. Collective risk management in Somalia 
Several collective risk management mechanisms have been implemented in Somalia 
because of the high level of security and corruption risk. Somalia has ‘weak state structures 
and volatile politics’, which allows greater scope for corruption and diversion of aid. Much aid is 
managed remotely from Kenya, making it hard for agencies to monitor corruption risks (OECD, 
2012, pp. 53–54).  
There are several examples of collective risk management mechanisms, although none 
has been evaluated. Risk is managed collectively under the Somalia Development and 
Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). The SDRD includes a Joint Risk Management Strategy and a 
Risk Management Group. Funds are pooled to mitigate risk, but some NGOs felt that this has 
forced them to operate within the constraints of the least flexible or most risk-averse fund 
contributor’ (Honig & Cramer, 2017, p. 15). The ICRC also has a risk management unit in 
Somalia. It ‘maintains a directory of aid and local actors’ (UNHCR, 2014, p. 1). UNICEF runs an 
Audit and Risk Management Working Group to help write policies and plans. It undertakes the 
following initiatives (Williams, Burke, & Wille, 2013, p. 13): 
 A Somalia Risk and Control Library to profile the risks of operating in Somalia and 
associated mitigation measures.  
 Developed a cross sector third party verification system into a full-fledged monitoring 
system designed to assist UNICEF in avoiding misappropriation, diversion and other 
forms of misuse of project funds/resources.  
 Establishing third party monitoring systems for specific sectoral/programme components 
by subcontracting monitoring to selected NGOs and Somali organisations. 
A 2016 Transparency International report suggests that in future, ‘the OCHA-led Access 
Taskforce may also act as a critical body for addressing some of the frontline challenges in 
dealing with corruption’ (Majid and Harmer, 2016, p. 35). 
It has not been possible to find published evaluations of these systems. 
United Nations (UN) Risk Management Unit (RMU) 
The UN Risk Management Unit (RMU) in Somalia was established in October 2011. It consists of 
a small team working from Nairobi. It is focused on fiduciary and reputational risks. It follows the 
ISO 31,000 risk management standards. Its resources and findings are shared between all UN 
country teams. It emphasises that UN agencies should have good risk management practices. It 
works as a ‘coordinating layer’ between agencies rather than directing or implementing particular 
policies (Williams et al., 2013, pp. 13–15). It helps to define common approaches through its 
working groups, the UN Risk Working Group and the Multi-Party Risk Working Group, and 
discussion with aid agencies in Somalia (RMU, n.d.).  
As well as providing help to UN agencies, it ‘has also begun to engage with [international non-
governmental organisations] INGOs to provide advice and feedback on an informal basis’ 
(Integrity Research & Consultancy, 2015, p. 19). 
It performs the following functions:  
 risk analysis. 
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 monitoring and surveillance. 
 investigations support. 
 direct agency support. 
 enhanced due diligence processes and methods.  
For example, the team will review cases of suspected malpractice brought to its attention. 
Another important aspect of its work is its Contractor Information Management System (CIMS), a 
database of projects and contractors. Problems with projects are recorded on the database and 
shared with UN agencies. As of 2013, the database included details of 1,200 partners with 
contracts worth more than USD450m.  
Given the widespread fiduciary risks of working in the environment, the RMU does not aim to 
blacklist local bodies. Instead it aims to address problems and improve performance. 
The RMU also provides ‘support to the risk management strategy for the UN MPTF, the 
production of integrated risk profiles for the Senior Management Group (SMG) and the 
dissemination of risk management best practices from the UN and beyond” (Project Risk 
Assessment Support, 2016).    
The RMU faces the following challenges (Williams et al., 2013, pp. 13–15): 
 It takes time to assess corruption risks, which can delay aid programmes. 
 The unit has ‘limited analytical capacity to meet the UN’s needs’ and is receiving a 
greater number of requests. 
 It does not give all agencies access to its database, which limits its effectiveness. This is 
because of: giving everyone access would make agencies less likely to submit potentially 
damaging information; and the need to keep the information confidential.  
Evaluation of the RMU’s work in Somalia remains piecemeal. A 2015 DFID report is the most 
thorough, although it has limitations. The DFID report states: ‘although there is clear evidence of 
greater awareness of risk management, it has been hard to calibrate to what extent the collective 
management of risk has actually improved beyond anecdotal evidence’ (DFID, 2015, p. 7).  
The RMU has received positive feedback from humanitarian staff and agencies. It was 
‘recognised as a best practice example in the Monitoring Group Report for Somalia’ in June 2012 
(Williams et al., 2013, pp. 13–15). One UN agency worker talked of ‘hopes of improvement [in 
corruption] because of RMU and black-listing of several local NGOs, and increased monitoring’ 
(Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 31).  On the negative side, a DFID report from 2015 suggests 
that ‘the potential of the RMU as a risk management tool is hindered by the UN agencies’ 
reluctance to share information or develop coherent policy approaches or standards’ (Integrity 
Research & Consultancy, 2015, p. 28).  
A 2015 DFID report on aid enablers has judged the RMU’s work positively. It states that the 
RMU has raised the ‘level of risk management’ among the agencies in Somalia (DFID, 2015, p. 
5). All 23 agencies within Somalia had an ERM system in 2015 (DFID, 2015, p. 7). It notes that 
the RMU’s ‘assessment of the fiduciary risks of potential contractors was cited as especially 
useful’. The RMU’s advice on risk handling and training were also seen as useful. The report also 
noted that the RMU was developing a ‘civil service tracking system’ to help identify duplication, 
and ‘supporting OCHA to implement a policy of deferred prosecutions’.  
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One potential negative consequence of an RMU or similar mechanism is that one donor 
may bear a disproportionate share of the costs (DFID, 2015, p. 5). The RMU also provides 
support to non-UN organisations and some of its risk management training is available online for 
no cost. DFID notes that the RMU has diversified its funding since 2010 (DFID, 2015, p. 10), but 
the risk remains that some donors and agencies may freeride on another’s funding of such units. 
The DFID review states that the RMU has been good value for money (DFID, 2015, p. 26).  
Another risk is that when donors are seen to be worried about fraud, any donor refusal to fund a 
local NGO may be attributed to fraud concerns, whether this is the reason or not (DFID, 2015, p. 
5). This risk is not created by RMUs, and an RMU or similar mechanism can help to lessen it by 
communicating clearly.  
Other examples 
The Risk Management Office (RMO) was established in Nepal in 2002 by the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID) and the German Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). It offers advice and training to staff from the two organisations. It 
provides information on risks around the country and possible scenarios arising (OECD, 2012, p. 
70). The RMO ‘receives positive reports from field workers and management, and has adapted 
over time to changing circumstances. Its proactive, politically aware approach differentiates it 
from narrower, security-minded risk management.’ However, it currently works for two agencies, 
but may struggle to scale up: ‘different administrative systems and requirements of DFID and GIZ 
created a burden that could have become unmanageable with a greater number of partners’ 
(OECD, 2014, p. 61). Figure 1 below summarises its functions in comparison to the UN RMU in 
Somalia. 
See: Figure 1: Comparison of the Nepal Risk Management Office and the Somalia Risk 
Management Unit (OECD, 2014, p. 60), https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-
resilience/docs/2014-10-30%20Approaches%20to%20Risk%20FINAL.pdf 
4. UN Risk Management Unit (RMU) in Afghanistan 
Background 
Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. A Transparency International 
Study, based on over 120 key-informant interviews and community consultations in Badakhshan, 
Herat and Nangarhar provinces, and Kabul, identifies the following risks (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 
2): 
 corruption during the negotiation of conditions for access and area selection for 
programming; the awarding of contracts (to private contractors and humanitarian 
agencies) and the procurement of goods and services; the selection and targeting of aid 
recipients;  
 nepotism and ethnic bias in staff hiring;  
 a lack of means to reliably hold corrupt staff and organisations accountable;  
 a lack of transparent and effective feedback mechanisms.  
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The report noted that ‘[c]orrupt practices were reported both within local government actors at the 
provincial and sub-provincial levels, as well as within the contracting chain with aid agencies 
(sometimes starting with the main recipient agency)’ (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 2). 
Remote and dangerous areas of Afghanistan are harder to monitor for corruption. Many 
NGOs use third party monitoring (TPM) to monitor their aid delivery in fragile or conflict-affected 
areas. The RMU identified a ‘monitoring gap’ because of ‘access constraints, including the 
difficulty in identifying partners (both NGOs and TPMs) who have both the access and capability 
required to undertake monitoring to a reliable standard’ (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 33). The risk of 
corruption is exacerbated by cuts in staff (18% between 2014 and 2016) and operating presence 
(30% between 2014 and 2016) (RMU Afghanistan, n.d., p. 3). A Transparency International 
report recommends taking steps to disseminate fraud policy to field level (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 
6). 
Most UN organisations had standardised fraud detection mechanisms, but many fewer 
had counter-fraud policies. The RMU surveyed 12 UN agencies. The only organisation that did 
not instead incorporated fraud detection into its procurement processes. Only just over half had 
specific counter-fraud policies. The rest had counter-fraud procedures, guidelines or regulations 
across different business areas. The RMU report argues that this approach is disjointed and 
ineffective (RMU Afghanistan, n.d., p. 4). In addition, according to a Transparency International 
report, agencies working in Afghanistan have not actively addressed corruption specifically in 
their joint discussions (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 4). Agencies are reluctant to talk about corruption in 
case it affects their reputations (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 33). 
Statistics on the number of instances of reported fraud suggest that it is likely 
underreported. The RMU surveyed 12 UN agencies working in Afghanistan. In the period 2014-
16, 77 cases of suspected fraud were reported by five agencies, while seven agencies reported 
no suspected fraud. The RMU report states that this may be because of poor detection, 
particularly as four of the agencies that reported no fraud have been told by the UN Office of 
Internal Oversight Services that they need better monitoring and data management. It could also 
be because of the lack of a common definition of fraud, which means that some agencies will 
only report confirmed cases while others will report suspected cases, for instance (RMU 
Afghanistan, n.d., p. 5). 
The UN Risk Management Unit (RMU) 
The United Nations (UN) Risk Management Unit (RMU) in Afghanistan was established in 2014. 
It advises UN entities, produces risk reports and thematic research, shares information and helps 
develop common standards, and provides training. 
See: Figure 2: Functions of the UN Risk Management Unit in Afghanistan 
http://collaborativemonitoring.com/blog/rmu-backgrounder/ 
The RMU in Afghanistan has undertaken the following work: 
 Led the Afghanistan Monitoring Accreditation Scheme (AMAS). The scheme was a 
collaboration between UN agencies, NGOs and doctors. It has ‘developed common 
minimum standards of monitoring and now seeks to identify and train individuals (men 
and women) who are linked to recognised organisations to become national monitors (at 
no cost to the participating individuals)’ (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 31).  
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 Designed ‘Common Minimum Standards for Due Diligence to assist the UN Country 
Team (UNCT) members in better due diligence, and to collectively raise the level and 
quality of information that is collected with respect to contractors and implementing 
partners. These were designed to be used as a checklist against UN agencies’ own 
processes for implementing partner/vendor due diligence. The standards provide a 
number of sample declarations. In 2015 OCHA adopted these minimum standards 
across all Common Humanitarian Funds globally’ (Harmer & Grunewald, 2017, p. 37). 
 Developed a contractor management system with nine of the largest agencies 
participating. 
 Developed a human resources portal, ‘with the goal of allowing HR departments to 
communicate with each other about potential fraud risks in hiring.’ However, the portal 
has not yet been used because of privacy concerns. 
 The RMU surveys risk management practices and patterns across agencies. For 
instance, a study shows that in a two-year period, 77 cases of suspected fraud were 
reported by five agencies, while seven agencies did not report any cases. ‘[t]he finding 
suggests that either the counter-fraud processes and systems employed by the UN are 
comprehensive and do mitigate the risk of fraud, or else that detection mechanisms are 
not robust enough or, possibly more likely, that fraud is not being reported’ (Harmer & 
Grunewald, 2017, p. 38).  
According to informants in Afghanistan, the RMU has ‘played an important role in providing good 
practice examples to the humanitarian community’ (Harmer et al, 2017, p. 33). This is derived 
from a report based on 120 informant interviews in Afghanistan. 
It has not been possible to locate any other in-depth published evaluations of the Risk 
Management Unit in Afghanistan. 
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